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In the 
Supreme Comt of the State of Utah 
GEORGE G. McANERNEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFE-
TY, DRIVERS' LICENSE D I V I -
SION, and GEORGE C. MILLER, 
Director, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8969 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as outlined in appellant's brief are substan-
tially correct and are not in dispute. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
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APPELLANT IS A HABITUAL NEGLIGENT 
DRIVER. 
(a) DEFINITION. 
(b) THE PROOF ADDUCED BY THE STATE 
WAS PROPER AND CONSTITUTIONAL. 
(c) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE HABITUAL NEGLIGENT DRIV-
ING. 
POINT III. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY PERMIT-
TING TWO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS TO BE 
CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT THE CON-
CLUSION THAT THREE VIOLATIONS OC-
CURRED WITHIN AN EIGHTEEN MONTH 
PERIOD. 
POINT IV. 
LICENSE TO DRIVE IS A PRIVILEGE AND 
THE DISCRETIONARY ACTION OF THE DI-




The Legislature has plenary power over the highways, 
which may impose conditions under which the limited right 
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of use may be exercised, and may regulate the manner and 
circumstances under which automobiles may be operated 
thereon. Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 
(1936). 
Pronouncements to the same effect may be found in 
practically every state. 
The power of the state to regulate traffic and prescribe 
conditions under which motor vehicles may be operated 
extends even to the power to prohibit their operation on 
highways when conditions or circumstances render it rea-
sonably necessary to bar such use for safety and protection 
of the public. 
This power (police power) is inherent in every sover-
eignty and permits the enactment of laws within constitu-
tional limits to promote the general welfare of the citizens. 
Therefore, in the interest of the public, the state may make 
and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote 
care on the part of all those who use its highways. Hadden 
v. Aitken, et al., 156 Neb. 215, 55 N. W. 2d 620 (1952). 
While it is the function of the State Legislature to make 
and ordain the laws, such measures necessarily must be put 
into effect by and through proper administrative agencies 
of government, operating by virtue of power and authority 
delegated to them by the Legislature. In the field of driver 
licensing, these administrative functions have been con-
ferred upon agencies such as the Department of Licensing 
in the State of Utah and the Public Safety Department. 
In all cases the Legislature selects the subject, and in-
dicates the public policy with respect thereto. The subject 
is thereby brought within governmental control. 
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POINT 11. 
APPELLANT IS A HABITUAL NEGLIGENT 
DRIVER. 
(a) DEFINITION. 
(b) THE PROOF ADDUCED BY THE STATE 
WAS PROPER AND CONSTITUTIONAL. 
(c) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
PROVE HABITUAL NEGLIGENT DRIV-
ING. 
POINT III. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY PERMIT-
TING TWO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS TO BE 
CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT THE CON-
CLUSION THAT THREE VIOLATIONS OC-
CURRED WITHIN AN EIGHTEEN MONTH 
PERIOD. 
POINT IV. 
LICENSE TO DRIVE IS A PRIVILEGE AND 
THE DISCRETIONARY ACTION OF THE DI-
RECTOR IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
It seems completely logical to combine respondent's 
arguments on Points II, III and IV of appellant's -brief. 
We shall attempt to do so in order. 
In answer to subparagraph (a) of Point II, respon-
dent declares that the record discloses to any reasonable 
mind that the appellant "repeated by force of habit" the vio-
lations charged against him. By his own admissions, Ex-
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5 
hibit P-1 and R. 13-24, appellant concedes he knew of 
posted limitations, but nevertheless contends if traffic was 
light and conditions good, a minor excess in his driving 
offended no one, hence he is not a habitual negligent driver. 
We submit that under the definition of "habitual" as set 
forth in appellant's brief, Mr. l\1cAnerney comes squarely 
within that definition. 
Appellant has stated the law which is designated as 
Section 42-2-19, U. C. A. 1953, on page 11 of his brief. 
The procedure as outlined by the Utah statutes is such 
that the department may subpoena witnesses and examine 
the licensee with respect to his violations. The licensee has 
under the law the right to demand the appearance of wit-
nesses against him and if such demand is made, the wit-
nesses. could and shouid be subpoenaed so that he may have 
the right of cross examination. This he did not do. The 
nature of the cause is civil and not criminal. At both the 
hearing before ·Miller and the Court, McAnerney testified 
regarding the citations. From his testimony alone the hear-
ings substantially support the findings. 
In the cases submitted by appellant the question of 
whether the license is a right or a privilege is considered. 
We submit that the license t? operate a motor vehicle on a 
publi~ highway is a privilege granted by the state and not 
guaranteed, nor is it an inalienable right. 
The weight of authority is to the effect that the driv-
ing of an automobile upon public highways is. a privilege 
and not a property right and is subject to reasonable reg-
ulation under the police power in the interest of public 
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safety and welfare. In a leading case involving the finan-
cial responsibility law of New Hampshire, Rosenblum v. 
Griffin, 89 N. H. 314, 197 A. 701, the court stated: 
"The operation of an automobile upon the public 
highway is not a right but only a privilege which 
the state may grant or withold at pleasure. What the 
state may withhold it may grant upon condition. 
* * * The statute confers a privilege which the 
citizen is at liberty to accept by becoming a licensee, 
or not, as he pleases. Having accepted the privilege 
he cannot object to any conditions which have been 
attached thereto by a grantor with power to entirely 
withhold the privilege." 
See Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (1953) ; Rawson 
v. Department of Licenses, 15 Wash. 2d 364, 130 P. 2d 876 
(1942) ; Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N. W. 2d 55 (1951). 
As to whether the proof adduced was improper, we 
call the Court's attention to the case of Carnegie v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety, 60 So. 2d 728 (Fla.) (Special Divi-
sion B 1952), where the court held: 
"Because it appears that the lower court may 
have misconceived its duties and responsibilities 
under Section 322.31, Florida Statutes, and for the 
future guidance of the courts in hearing 'appeals' 
under the provisions of this statute we feel it in-
cumbent to point out that Section 322.31 requires 
the court on such appeal to take testimony and ex-
amine into the facts of the case, and to determine 
whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is 
subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of 
his license under the provisions of this chapter." 
In construing a similar provision of the Pennsylvania Ve-
hicle Code, 75 PS, para. 193, the courts of that state have 
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uniformly held that the cases are heard' de novo by the 
court and not merely as a review of the action of the de-
partment charged with the enforcement of the Vehicle Code 
of that state; that it is the duty of the court "to hear evi-
dence and determine in the exercise of its sound discretion 
and in the furtherance of justice whether the license should 
be suspended." 
This would certainly seem to be the better rule, where 
as in this state the department is authorized to suspend 
without a hearing and the operator may appeal, directly 
to a court of record from such suspension, so that the hear-
ing before the court is the first opportunity he has had to 
present his side of the story and to confront and cross ex-
amine the witnesses against him. While the policies de-
veloped by the department in the course of its enforcement 
of the Drivers' License Act should be given due considera-
tion by such court, we hold with the Pennsylvania courts 
that such court has the jurisdiction and responsibility to 
make its own findings of fact independently of the ex parte 
administrative findings of the department. 
In this case a "hearing" was had before George Miller, 
the Director of the Drivers' License Division, and in his 
opinion there was sufficient evidence to suspend the license 
of the appellant. Upon the proper proceeding the matter 
was brought before the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District of Salt Lake County, Utah, and upon that hearing 
(de novo) the court determined that the license as sus-
pended should be affirmed. 
Throughout appellant's brief there is a contention that 
the operative clauses of the law are unconstitutional due 
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to the fact that they are in violation of the due process 
clause of both the United States Constitution and the Con-
stitution of Utah. In that respect, may we make this fur-
ther observation. The fact that the suspension of a driver's 
license by a Motor Vehicle Administrator before affording 
the licensee an opportunity to be heard on the matter vio-
lates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution, and likewise to that amendment of 
the Utah State Constitution which provides that no state 
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law, it has been determined by the courts 
construing statutes similar to ours in the following manner. 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in· expressing the ma-
jority view of the American courts on this point-that fail-
ure to provide such an opportunity for a prior hearing does 
not constitute a denial-of due process of law-said in Thorn-
hill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (1953): 
"Increase on highway casualties is one of the 
most impelling social questions now confronting the 
public. Civic. bodies and law enforcement officers 
at every level are bending their efforts to reduce 
them; To hold that the Legislature must provide 
notice and a hearing to one charged with flagrantly 
abusing his use of the highways before he can be 
stopped from using them, would not only be unjust 
to the public, it would place an intolerable burden 
on enforcement officers. We think the provision for 
hearing after suspension of one's license meets every 
requirement of the process." 
Following through with the substance of the previous 
enunciation by the court, we are firmly of the opinion that 
the essence of a claim of denial of due process seems to be 
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that the appellant's license was suspended by the Director 
without a proper hearing. The statute does not require 
the Director to give such a hearing prior to suspension of 
a license, whenever he has reason to believe that the holder 
thereof is an improper or incompetent person to operate 
motor vehicles or is operating so as to endanger the public. 
The information upon which the Director acts may turn 
out to be erroneous (and for that reason the right of review 
before a board of appeal is given). We have no doubt that 
these provisions of law are reasonable regulations in the 
interest of safeguarding lives and property from highway 
accidents. The incident hardship upon an individual motor-
ist, in 'having his. license suspended pending investigation 
and review must be borne in deference to the creater public 
interest served by the statutory restriction,. It seems to us 
that it is well settled that the concept of due process of law 
does not necessarily require the granting of a hearing prior 
to the taking of official action in the exercise of the police 
power. When justified by compelling public interest, the 
Legislature may authorize some action subject to later judi-
cial review of its validity.' 
There seems to be some question in the brief of appel-
lant that the sl!spension or revocation is a penalty and that 
the appellant has been twice- in jeopardy and that as a 
result thereof certain violations previous to the one in 1958 
should not be considered as a basis for his final suspension. 
Our law specifically provides that a suspension by the Di-
rector may_be_ imposed if the licensee .has three moving vio-
lations within a period of 18 consecutive months. In this 
case, the driver, Mr. McAnerney, while having been sus-
pended by virtue of certain violations in 1957, still had three 
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consecutive violations within an 18 month period from that 
time until1958 when his license was finally suspended again 
by the Director of the License Division. 
The argument with respect to the withdrawal of the 
driving privilege as being a penalty in addition to the fine 
or penalty imposed by the court where the law requires 
mandatory suspenson or revocation, or discretionary sus-
pension or revocation, is given consideration in the case of 
Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 407,4 S. E. 2d 762 (1939), 
wherein the court answered the argument as follows: 
"Within the limits prescribed by law, the trial 
court fixed a measure of punishment for each of-
fense. The penalty of being deprived of the right to 
operate a motor vehicle is not a part of, nor within 
the limits of the punishment to be fixed by the court 
or jury." 
And again in the case of Pritchard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 
17 S. E. 2d 393 (1941), the court commented: 
"The question as to whether the revocation of a 
license because of an act for which the licensee has 
been convicted or because of the conviction itself 
is an added punishment has frequently been before 
the courts. The universal holding is that such a re-
vocation is not an added punishment, but is a find-
ing that by reason of the commission of the act or 
the conviction of the licensee, the latter is no longer 
a person fit to hold and enjoy the privilege which 
the state had heretofore granted to him under its 
police power. The authorities agree that the purpose 
of the revocation is to protect the public and not to 
punish the licensee." 
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It is quite possible that the proceedings before the Di-
rector were not in full accordance with judicial practices, 
but, nevertheless, he, acting in a quasi judicial capacity, 
had the right to either subpoena or not to subpoena wit-
nesses unless demand was made upon him by the appellant 
(which demand was not made) and to examine the licensee 
and from such examination to determine whether or not 
the appellant McAnerney, was in his judgment a habitual 
negligent driver and a menace on the highways of the State 
' of Utah. The District Court, having full jurisdiction, con-
sidered the facts and the evidence, and determined that the 
appellant was a habitual negligent driver and was, there-
fore not entitled to have his license reinstated. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the respondent, Mr. Miller, acted within 
his administrative powers and that the District Court, in 
sustaining him in such action, did not err. We therefore 
further submit that the decision of the lower court should 
be affirmed and that the appellant go hence with his costs 
herein incurred. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALLACE B. KELLY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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